Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1982

Dee Jay Bigler and Carol Bigler v. Mapleton
Irrigation Canal Co et al : Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Michael L. Deamer; Ungricht, Randle & Deamer; Attorneys for Appellants;
Richard B. Johnson; Howard, Lewis & Peterson; Attorneys for Respondents;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Bigler v. Mapleton Irrigation Canal Co., No. 18256 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2949

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DEE JAY BIGLER and CAROL
BIGLER, his wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents
vs.
MAPLETON IRRIGATION CANAL
COMPANY and JOHN DOES
I, II and III
Defendants-Appellants

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. 18256

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
MAPLETON IRRIGATION CANAL COMPANY AND
JOHN DOES I, II AND III

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE E. BALLIF
DISTRICT JUDGE

Michael L. Deamer
UNGRICHT; RANDLE & DEAMER
Attorneys for Appellants
Suite 514 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Richard B. Johnson
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON
Attorneys for Respondents
120 East 300 North Street
Provo, Sponsored
Utah by84603
6Library
1982Services
the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute ofJUL
Museum2
and

FILED

Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~--···-·-------····--·-·----·--···-··-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DEE JAY BIGLER and CAROL
BIGLER, his wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents
vs.
MAPLETON IRRIGATION CANAL
COMPANY and JOHN DOES
I, II and III,
Defendants-Appellants

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. 18256

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
MAPLETON IRRIGATION CANAL COMPANY
AND JOHN DOES I, II AND III

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE E. BALLIF
DISTRICT JUDGE

Michael L. Deamer
UNGRICHT, RANDLE & DEAMER
Attorneys for Appellants
Suite 514 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Richard B. Johnson
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON
Attorneys for Respondents
120 East 300 North Street
Provo, Utah 84603

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
NATURE OF CASE .
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . .

2

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

POINT II:

THE JURY DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED
BECAUSE THE COURT IMPROPERLY IMPOSED A
HIGHER STANDARD OF CARE ON APPELLANTS
BY GIVING JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 8
THAN REQUIRED BY UTAH LAW ~ . . . . . . .
THE JURY FINDING OF ONE HUNDRED PERCENT
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF APPELLANTS
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY SUBSTANTIAL
OR REASONABLE EVIDENCE AND AS SUCH
SHOULD BE REVERSED . . . . . . • .

POINT III: THE JURY'S FINDING OF NO CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE BY RESPONDENTS IS NOT
SUBSTANTIATED BY THE EVIDENCE .
CONCLUSION

...............
'

5

12

17
18

AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES
Anderson v. Pleasant Grove Irrigation Company
26 Utah 2d 420, 490 P2d 897 (1971) . . . . . . · . ·
Brian v. Fremont Irrigation Company
112 Utah 220, 186 P2d 588 (1947)
Erickson v. Bennion
28 U2d 371, 503 P2d 139 (1972)

10

. · · · · · · · ·

7

· · · · · · ·

12

Fletcher v. Rylands
LR 3 HL 330, l Eng Rul Cas 256 (1868) • . . . . . · ·

6, 8

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CASES
Jordan v. Mount Pleasant
15 Utah 449 . . • • •

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

s

•

•

•

•

7

•

McKay v. Breeze
72 Utah 305, 310, 269 Pac. 1026 (1928)

6' 8

Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Association
563 P2d 1247 (1977) • . • . . . • • . . • •

18

STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated 73-1-18

6

Utah Code Annotated 73-1-15

11

Utah Code Annotated 78-27-3

18

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights
Second Edition, Section 912, pages 1614-1616

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

7

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DEE JAY BIGLER and CAROL
BIGLER, his wife,

)
)
)

Plaintiffs-Respondents
vs.

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)

MAPLETON IRRIGATION CANAL
COMPANY and JOHN DOES
I, II and III,
Defendants-Appellants

CASE NO. 18256

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
MAPLETON IRRIGATION CANAL COMPANY

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action for negligent flooding of respondents'
property.

The court entered judgment on a jury finding that

appellants were negligent and the sole and proximate cause of
all of the damage.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment entered on the
grounds that the wrong standards of law were applied by the
court and the jury finding is not supported by the evidence
and facts.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant Mapleton Irrigation Canal Company is a nonprofit
corporation.

(TR 504)* that provides irrigation water to its

shareholders and derives its income by assessing shareholders for
the use of water.

Appellant receives its water principally from

the Strawberry Reservoir with diversion dams in Hobble Creek
Canyon.

The water flows down a main canal with turnouts to

approximately twenty-seven lateral canals.

From each of the

lateral canals there are approximately twelve to fifteen branch
ditches or sublaterals which service the individual home owners
and farmers.

Locks are placed on the headgates from the

Strawberry and Hobble Creek turnouts into the lateral ditch known
as the Fullmer. TR_22...Q_.

There are approximately two hundred

branch ditches with some two thousand privately owned dams or
turnouts.
Water is diverted from the main canal and laterals by a
water master.

When water is turned down a lateral ditch into a

sublateral, the water master notifies the user at the head of the
ditch that the water is coming and that they will be allocated a
certain amount of water.

Each individual then notifies the next

person that the water is coming down the sublateral or branch
ditch.

Water is diverted from branch ditch onto individual

properties by headgates installed and maintained by individual

*(All references to the District Court file are designated "TR"
with the page number following).
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shareholders.

Each person, as his turn arrives, removes the

headgate to allow the water onto his property and inserts his
headgate into the main flow of the branch ditch, thereby turning
out the water onto his property for the period of time that he is
entitled. (TR 308).

So long as the headgates to the individual

property owners are in their normal place, the water flows down
the branch ditch, passed the property and out into a drainage
area that absorbs all waste water.
Appellants have a policy and practice of requiring that
headgates diverting water out of branch ditches be kept out of
the

ditch

in the event

waste

water or irrigation water

unexpectedly comes down those ditches.

(TR 507,508).

The

shareholders at annual meetings have been advised to keep their
headgates out of said branch ditches,
penalties if they do not. (TR 308)

(TR 508), and assessed

The flow of water down the

canals is not constant and varies considerably. (TR 285 & 506).
Respondents as shareholders participated in and utilized
appellants' system for eleven years preceding the accident,

and

accordingly had diverted the water during their time and then
passed

it

on

down

to

subsequent

users,

(TR

196,

203).

Respondents owned their own headgate and put it in themselves.
(TR 240). Respondents were aware of appellants' policy and agreed
that that was a policy that had been pursued over the years. (TR
257).
On August 24, 1979, respondents were the last users of the
water in the sublateral or branch ditch, and when the watering
turn ended and the water ceased to flow respondents did not pull
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out their headgates which left a continuing dam or blockage to
any

water

coming

down

the

sublateral

ditch

(TR

330).

Respondents' watering turn ended and the water ceased to flow at
approximately 4:30 p.m.

Sometime in the middle of the night,

some amount of water came down the lateral ditch, was diverted by
respondents' headgate onto respondents' property,
flooding the property,

causing damage to the home,

thereby
personal

effects and property of respondents.
Respondents admitted that had the headgate been removed they
would not have been

floo~ed.

(TR 250, 254).

The testimony of

Mr. Bigler on cross examination at TR 250, line 7 provides:
"Question.
water.

On the 24th day of August you took the

The water came to you and your boy took it.

He put the headgate in.

And then you left and went

to work and your wife went to a function of some sort,
and the dam was not taken out, was it?
"Answer:
"Question.

No.
If the dam had been removed as you had done

for nine years other than about three times, you would
not have been flooded, would you?
' 'Answer.

No."

There was also testimony that water may unexpectedly be in
the ditch if someone downstream asked for it. (TR 521).

In fact,

Mr. Mayberry, a user downstream, said he could always use all
excess water on his hay field where the water only runs about
one-third the distance down. (TR 535).
Respondents commenced an action in the Fourth Judicial
District
Court alleging negligence and seeking monetary damages.
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The matter was tried to a jury and a special verdict was rendered
finding appellants negligent and the sole and
all damage.
by the

pr~ximate

cause of

No allocation of cause or negligence was attributed

jury to respondents.

Judgment

was

entered against

appellants in the amount of $8,361.70 plus costs of $363.10.
cash bond of $300.00 has been posted

A

with the court and

subsequently a supersedeas bond in the amount of $8,361.70 was
filed with the court.
Appellants take no issue with the dollar amount of damages
found by the jury, but only dispute (1) the standard of legal
liability imposed by the court and relied upon by the jury and
(2) the jury finding that appellants' irrigation company was
negligent.
. ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE JURY DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE COURT
IMPROPERLY IMPOSED A HIGHER STANDARD

OF CARE ON

APPELLANTS

BY

GIVING JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 8, THAN REQUIRED BY UTAH LAW.
Appellants particularly take exception to Instruction No. 8
given to the jury (TR 571) because it imposes a higher standard
of care upon appellants, than required by Utah law.
The court stated that it was the duty of appellant to:
"No. 3. To use reasonable care in knowing where the water
is in its irrigation system to prevent same from flowing
into ditches where users are not on notice of its presence,
or expectation in such ditch."
Appellants submit that there is no case law or statutory law
in the State of Utah that requires appellants to know where the
water is in all of its sublateral or branch ditches at all times.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The law only requires that appellants use ordinary care in the
construction, maintenance and operation of its ditches so as to
prevent any damage or injury to the property of others. See UCA
73-1-18;

McKay!:.. Breeze, 72 Utah 305, 310, 269 Pac. 1026 (1928)

and cases cited therein.
Even though the above instruction is

couched in terms of

"to use reasonable care in knowing .•• " the standard is vague
enough that it implies appellant must know at all times and at
all places and under all circumstances where the water is.

In

this case it means knowing there was water in a ditch in the
middle of the night. By charging

appellants with the duty to

know where all water is in its sublateral ditches at all times
imposes strict liability upon appellants.
In

the

an c i en t

ca s e

of

f.1~!££~£.

v•

.Rz!~!!~~,

LR 3 HL 330, 1 Eng Rul Cas 256 (1868), the doctrine of strict
liability was first enunciated wherein the owner of a mill built
a reservoir and when the reservoir was partially filled with
water, the dam broke through into old mine workings under the
site of the reservoir, of whose existence the defendant was
ignorant, and thence into the mines resulting in heavy loss.

The

House of Lords held:
"We think that the true rule of law is that the person,
who for his own purposes, brings on his land and collects
and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it
escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does
not do so he is prima facie answerable for all the
damage which is a natural consequence of its escape."
The court in Rylands subsequently modified the liability for
a ny "nonna t ur a 1 " us e of t he 1 a nd •

1.£!.9..:.

No e v i d e n c e wa s

presented at the trial in the present case as to the source of
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the water that came down the ditch in the middle of the night
that was diverted by respondent onto his property causing the
damage.

The water could have been waste water that was otherwise

draining off over-saturated ground and flowing back into the
ditches.

In

Brian~

Fre!!!ont Irrigation Company, 112 Utah 220,

186 P2d 588 (1947), this court held that since Utah is one of the
arid states and conservation of water is of the utmost importance
to the public welfare:
" •.• To waste water is to injure that welfare, and it
is therefore the duty of the user of water to return
surplus or waste water into the stream from which
it was taken so that further use can be made by
others." Citing Kinney on Irrigation and Water
Rights, Second Edition, Section 912, pages 1614-1616,
at page 590.
The court in Brian noted that the channels served as natural
drainage for

the

waters

in the area,

and therefore denied

plaintiff's cause of action for waste water flowing back into a
canal upstream from plaintiff, which overflooded and damaged
plaintiff's property.
Since the water in the present case came unexpectedly during
the night, the source seems of primary importance.

Other sources

of excess water that may have been in the sublateral ditch that
evening could include flash flooding from heavy rainfall.

See

Jordan:!._:._ _t!ount Pleasant, 15 Utah 449, which holds, among other
things,

that

companies are not liable for

unlooked for

or

overwhelming displays of power, such as storms, but they may be
required to meet weather emergencies that may be reasonably
expected.

No evidence was presented as to the weather and the

potential for flash flooding.
Other excess waters could have come from percolating or
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subsurface waters, or mountain runoff, or regular irrigation
company water.

In any event,

the absence of such evidence

showing the source or the nature of the water causing the damage,
except that "it was present" imposes a strict liability standard
on appellant.

This prevents

appellant from exercising ordinary

care, because appellant is liable whether reasonable care is
exercised or not and whether he knew about the water or not.
~£!~Z ~ ~~~~~~

In

~~£~~'

this court held that no

negligence was shown that defendant failed to prevent seepage and
flood damage to plaintiff when constructing a new irrigation
ditch through otherwise very porous soil. The court in McKay,
expressly rejected the doctrine of strict liability set forth in
Fletcher

!:_,

Ryland, supra probably in furtherance of a public

policy of encouraging private irrigation companies to meet the
water

needs

of

agricultural

communities

by

imposing

less

stringent standards of care.
Appellant submits that it would be unwise to now impose
strict liability on shareholder irrigation companies for the
following additional policy reasons:
(1) There are some two hundred sublateral or branch ditches
in appellants' system and about two thousand

individual dams or

turnouts, constructed and owned by individual property owners.
Public policy would better be served by leaving the determination
of responsibility for flooding and damage to the shareholders of
the company.

Here the shareholders annually approve a practice

of imposing a financial penalty on individuals who
diversion headgates in the branch ditch.

leave their

To hold appellant
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liable in this case, defeats that self determination and imposes
a legal requirement that the water master personally walk down
each ditch every time to insure all two thousand headgates are
properly situated before any water is turned down the ditch, with
the company bearing the responsibility for failure to do so.
(2)

Individual property owners are in a better position to

police and maintain their diversion dams in situations where
children are mischievous or playful in daming a branch ditch to
swim or float

boats,

etc.

Parents can better handle their

children than the water master can.

(3) To hold appellant strictly liable creates a situation
where individual farmers,

who have suffered crop failure or

financial loss, could simply leave their dams in the branch ditch
in the middle of the night hoping to catch some water and then
seek restitution for damage to their property from the irrigation
company.

(4)

The laws in Utah ought to support private irrigation

companies providing low cost irrigation water to agriculture
communities. Appellant as a non-profit corporation seeks only to
meet expenses and not make a profit.

Higher standards of legal

care impose higher costs and would force the company to seek
governmental subsidies through taxation.

Appellant submits that

to impose strict liability of requiring appellants to know where
any and all water is at all times is not in the best interests of
the parties or the people of the state of Utah

and is a

legislative decision.
A second point regarding Instruction No. 8

that merits

consideration
is that even if appellants are held strictly liable
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to know where all water is in all their sublateral ditches at all
times, appellants submit it is not the law in the state of Utah
that notice be given to all property owners when water is passing
through the sublateral ditch to another location.

In the case of

Anderson v. Pleasant Grove Irrigation Co_!!!pany, 26 Utah 2d 420,
490 P2d 897 (1971), this court held that an irrigation company
could not

escape liability on the theory that the duty to see

where the water went after receiving notice of their turn was on
the shareholder.

In Anderson the ·facts were substantially

different from the present case,

in that a non-user had

previously notified the ·irrigation company of the potential for
flooding and had asked the irrigation company to exercise care in
seeing that any water passing through his land would not
overflow.

The irrigation company then having been put on notice

failed to take such reasonable care to prevent the flooding and
damage to the shareholders' property.

The court in Anderson

never imposed a duty on the irrigation company to notify the
plaintiff every time that water would be flowing through or
passed his premises.

Appellant submits that no case heretofore

decided in the State of Utah has imposed an obligation on any
irrigation company to notify individual property owners when
water is passing through a sublateral or branch ditch on their
property.

In fact, legal counsel for respondents argued that the

failure to provide this notice in the middle of the night by
appellants was the cause of the damage and constituted negligence
under Utah law, which was an improper statement of Utah State
Law.

( See Transcript at pages TR 576,

577,

579,

580,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

582,

583,606,

From

607.)

the

respondents readily admitted

facts
that

illicited at
had

they not

the

trial,

left

their

headgate in, thereby turning the water out onto their property
and had the headgate been removed as they had done for

the

preceding nine years, other than about three times, the property
would not have been flooded.

(TR 250).

spoken

the

rather

forcibly

on

The Utah Legislature has

subject

that

any

individual

diverting water from its water course, except to prevent damage
to private property, is acting contrary to Utah State Law and is
guilty of a misdemeanor and is subject to damages and ·costs. UCA

73-1-15 provides:
"Obstructing canals or other water courses-penalties.
Whenever any person,--Partnership company or corporation
has a right of way of any established type or title for
any canal or other water course, it shall be unlawful
for any person, persons, or government agencies to
place or maintain in place any obstruction or change
of the water flow by fence or otherwise along or across
or in such canal or water course, except as where said
water course inflicts damage to private proper~y,
without first receiving written permission for the
change and providing gates sufficient for the passage
of the owner or owners of such canal or water course.
That the vested rights in the established canals and
and water course shall be protected against all
encroachment. That indemnifying agreements may be
entered as may be just and proper by governmental
agencies. Any person, partnership company or
corporation violating the provisions of this
section is guilty of a misdemeanor and is subject
to damages and costs."
Appellant submits that "other water course" within the meaning of
the above statute, applies to all lateral, sublateral and branch
ditches of irrigation companies.

Appellants believe that one of

the reasons why the headgate was left in the sublateral ditch by
respondents was to turn any excess water onto their property.
Appellants submit that the court applied the wrong standard
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of law imposjng strict liability upon them for all water going
down sublateral or branch ditches, whether or not they had notice
of said water and regardless of the source of said water.
Furthermore, respondents' intervening act which diverted the
water from the sublateral onto its property,
law and company policy and procedures.

violated statutory

The water otherwise would

have gone down the sublateral into the drainage area, causing no
injury to anyone.
POINT II
THE JURY FINDING OF ONE HUNDRED PERCENT NEGLIGENCE ON THE
PART OF APPELLANTS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY SUBSTANTIAL OR
REASONABLE EVIDENCE AND AS SUCH SHOULD BE REVERSED.
This court in Erickson

Y..:_

Bennion, 28 U2d 371, 503 P 2d 139

(1972), reiterated the general standard of appellant review of
not upsetting a finding

by a

jury if any reasonable or

substantial basis exists to support it.
held

that

plaintiff's

contributory

In

Erickson, the court

negligence

in

having

a

driveway built without a culvert caused his own damage by
diverting defendant's irrigation water onto his property.
Appellants submit that respondents in the pesent case failed to
present any compelling or substantial evidence upon which a jury
could rely, establishing that appellants were negligent in the
operation of the sublateral or branch ditches.

No evidence was

presented that appellants failed to repair or maintain their
ditches.

In fact the ditches are in good operating order, do not

allow seepage and are adequate for the normal flow of water.

The

dam gate where the problem arose belongs to respondent (TR 240)
and is built out of concrete with a firm plywood board being
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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inserted in the grooves that sufficiently turns the water out of
the lateral ditch onto respondents' property.
12.

See Exhibit No.

No evidence was ever presented that the sublateral or branch

ditches were improperly constructed or that the dykes, dams or
turnouts were improperly constructed.
No evidence was presented by respondents that the failure to
lock up

a headgate on the main ditch or lateral ditch on any

g i v en o cc as _i on was t he cause of the damage to res pond en ts •

The

testimony of the water master, Doc Snow, (Transcript page 27 line
10 through 13) indicated that it was his job to check and make

sure that the locks on those headgates on the distribution system
were in good repair.

In fact, in testimony set forth in the

deposition of Doc Snow (Deposition of Louis Snow-page 5-which was
published) (TR 226-227) information was provided that appellants
always kept the main canals locked and he kept them locked up.
From the transcript of proceedings, no mention was made of any
failure to keep the main canals locked up.

The only possible

evidence was a hearsay statement testified to by Mr. Bogardus
(Transcript, ·page 265, line 17 through 20) to the effect that Mr.
Bleggi indicated to the water master that "the gate should be
chained and locked".

However, i t appears from the transcript of

the proceedings that no evidence was ever presented or offered,
which would indicate that the failure to keep the gate chained
and locked was the direct cause of the harm to respondents.

In

fact, no evidence was ever presented as to the source of the
water, whether i t was from rain, flooding, runoff from oversaturated land, percolation, or

diver~ion

by other

indi~iduals
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of

water into the sublateral ditches.

Appellants submit that there

is not any substantial evidence upon which a jury could rely in
finding negligence attributable to appellants as to the lockups
of the main canals, laterals, sublaterals, or branch ditches
where the incident occurred.
Respondents did allege that the system of taking turns,
followed by appellants over the past fourteen years,

and of

notifying the individual at the head of a sublateral ditch who
then notifies the next person down the line,
negligence.

constituted

Respondent Bigler testified that he has operated

under such system for approximately eleven years.

(TR 196)

Respondent also testified that he has read the statement of
policy of appellants' irrigation company and agrees that it is
the policy that irrigation company pursues.

(TR 257)

Another

witness for respondent, Donald Bogardus also testified that he
was acquainted with appellants' policy on notification (TR 266267) and furthermore testified that he knew if he left his
headgate in very long, he would get flooded.

Mr. Bogardus stated

at TR 267 lines 15 through 19:
"Question:

And if you left your headgate in very long,

you may get flooded, is that correct?
"Answer:

Yes, I knew that I wouldn't know when the

water was coming in the ditch, so I always left the
headgate out."
Appellants offered testimony (at TR 308) that the users
themselves agreed to notify each other down the line when water
was coming and when their headgate should be removed to allow the
water to flow down the sublateral ditch.

It

had

been the
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established policy of appellants' irrigation company for the last
fourteen years and, in fact, at annual meetings the policy was
announced and discussed.

(TR 507,

511,

553)

Appellants

attempted to introduce evidence as to the custom and common usage
of following such procedure throughout Utah County by the various
irrigation companies, which proffer of evidence was refused by
the court and

which the

consider. (TR 566-67).

jury never

had

the opportunity to

The proffer would have set forth the so

called "turn system" such as the Springville System which allows
each user. to take his turn and thereby imposing an obligation
upon the water users to open and close their own gates and notify
the next ones in line that the water was available.

Appellants

submit that should this court conclude that the notification or
"turn system" employed by appellants constituted negligence in
this case, then appellants should have been given the opportunity
to present evidence on the common usage and practice in the state
and community, together with the reasons and history for such
use.

The failure to allow evidence on this point is reversable

error.
One additional area which is misunderstood may have unduly
influenced the jury.

For some unexplained reason the water

master's records for the month in question were missing from his
book.

This disappearance is not substantial evidence upon which

a jury could rely to find that appellant was negligent in the
operation of its irrigation system.

Under the irrigation company

rules, an individual can only receive so much water as he is
entitled to evidenced by his shares or ownership in the
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irrigation company.
of water.

Each share receives only so much cubic feet

The water master's records, although not the best, do

indicate the number of hours that an individual receives water on
any given day.

The date of August 24, 1979, when the accident

occurred, was at or near the end of the watering season.

From

the records at the end of the year, it could be established the
amount

of water that each shareholder received.

If any

shareholder received more water than his shares entitled him to
he would be liable to the company for such excess water.
unfortunate,

but .appellants b'eli eve,

because of this fact,

shareholder in the system obtained and tore out the pages of

It is
some
the

water master's book in order to conceal the fact that he received
more

water

than he was entitled to.

No evidence was ever

presented by any of the parties that the water master or the
officers and directors of appellant irrigation company themselves
destroyed the records, nor did they in any way consent to the
destruction of records by individuals known to them.

If the jury

relied upon the torn out records to find negligence on the part
of appellant, then said evidence is insufficient to warrant a
finding of negligence or causation by appellants.
The only evidence presented was that during the night some
unknown amount of water from some unknown source, came done one
of 200 branch ditches, and was diverted by respondents headgates
onto the property causing the damage.

The headgate should have

been removed to allow the water to flow by harmlessly.
Excluding

the

hearsay statement of Mr.

Bleggi,

disregarding the fact that daily records were missing,

and

there is

no evidence of negligence other than water was present in the
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Appellants submit the evidence is

branch ditch that night.

insufficient to substantiate the jury verdict.
POINT III
THE JURY'S FINDING OF NO CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE BY
RESPONDENTS IS NOT SUBSTANTIATED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Respondents testified that had they removed their headgate
they would not have been flooded or damaged.

The testimony of

Mr. Bigler on cross examination at TR 250, line 7 provides:
"Question:
water.

On the 24th day of August, you took the

The water came to you and your boy took it.

He put the headgate in.

And then you left and went

to work and your wife went to a function of some ·
sort and the dam was not taken out, was it?
"Answer:
"Question:

No."
If the dam had been removed as you had done

for nine years, other than about three times, you would
not have been flooded, would you?
"Answer:

No."

Another witness for respondent, Mr. Bogardus testified that
he knew that if he left his headgate in that the water would be
turned onto his property, and he would be flooded.
15).

(TR 267 line

Appellants do not dispute the testimony of respondents in

this regard that had they removed their dam, they would not have
been flooded.

Appellants do submit that it was foreseeable that

water could possibly

come down the ditch.

Appellants presented

testimony of Mr. Mayberry, a party further down the line on the
sublateral or branch ditch, that he could always use any excess
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Mr. Mayberry stated at TR 534-535 beginning at line 17:

water.

"Question:

Do you have any knowledge, Mr. Mayberry,

as to whether any water has come down that ditch,
other than on scheduled times when you were taking
the water?
"Answer:

I can't pinpoint a definite time, but I

imagine there was about a half-a-dozen times that
we had waste water come down the ditch.
sic

We welcomes

it, because the water over there is very rare

and very scarce in that ditch.
"Question:

Let me ask you this:

Are you or are you

not short of water, then?
"Answer:

Well, we don't have too much, that's true.

"Question:

And you have stated that you welcomed

the water, is that correct?
"Answer:

That's right."

Appellants submit that the jury finding of no contributory
negligence on the part of respondents
supported by the . evidence presented.
Rigtrup

!..!. Stra~be£.!.1. ~ater

is

wrong and

is not

See generally UCA 78-27-37,

Users Association,

563 P2d 1247

(1977).

·CONCLUSION
Appellants submit that the decision and judgment of the
lower court should be reversed because:
1.

The court applied the wrong standard of law in its jury

instructions,

which was tantamount to imposing strict liability
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on appellant irrigation company for any and all water found in
its sublateral or branch ditches.

Furthermore,

charging

appellants with the knowledge of said water and requiring them
to give notice to everyone that said water is passing by or
through their property in said sublateral ditch at all times is
contrary to the law heretofore established in Utah.
2.

No substantial or reasonable evidence was presented to

the jury setting forth negligence in the operation,

care and

maintenance of said ditches, nor demonstrating that appellant
violated any duty of care to respondents.

3.

The jury was wrong in finding no contributory negligence

by respondents, based upon respondents' own testimony that _the
flooding and damage would have been avoided had respondent
removed the headgate from the ditch after his· watering turn,
which respondent had the opportunity to do, but failed to do.
The judgment of the District Court should be vacated and the
matter should be remanded back to the District Court for a trial
applying the proper standards o
DATED this

2/-

law in the State of Utah.

day of

2.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19

